How does the Akrates intentionally do what he intended not to without changing his mind? by Sultana, Mark
  
 
1 
How does the akratês intentionally do what he intended not to without changing his 
mind?
1
 
 
Terms related to the concept of akrasia are paradigmatically used when one does something that 
one knows does not coincide with one‟s conception of doing well. Such doing may be explained 
as being „due to weakness‟. Alternatively, one may recognize that one was quite clear-headed in 
acting akratically; at the time of committing such an action, one may have reasoned that, for once, 
one did not care. Now such occurrences, in the life of an agent, are hardly controversial. The 
problem is that it becomes surprisingly difficult to conceptualize the case where one clear-
headedly intends to act contrary to one‟s convictions about what it is good to do in such-and-such 
circumstances; cases which are surely exceedingly and disappointingly common. Indeed, 
Anscombe complains that, whereas Aristotle deals with cases where passion, or failure to keep 
clear one‟s proper ends before one‟s mind explains akrasia, “[h]e apparently cannot admit the 
case where a person forms a perfectly clear-headed intention of acting contrary to his 
convictions”.2 
One difficulty, here, appears to be the propensity of certain philosophers to assimilate practical 
reasoning to theoretical reasoning to the greatest possible extent. The blame for this mischief may, 
indeed, partly be laid at Aristotle‟s door. For, in his explanation of practical reasoning – an 
extremely important conceptual innovation of his – he often tries hard to show it to be, formally, 
as similar as possible to theoretical reasoning3. He shows himself to be keen on this assimilation 
particularly in De motu animalium; his reason is that he wants to make the manner, in which the 
practical syllogism sets the (human) animal in motion, clear.4 However, one must aver that, while 
there certainly are law-like generalizations about human actions, these are not mechanical 
generalizations. 
One must here attend to the categorial distinction  between reasons and causes. To use the 
example Anscombe refers to in the last paragraph of her landmark work Intention,5 if one were to 
ask St Peter why he was feeling afraid in the courtyard, he could have replied that he was afraid of 
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ending up in the same way as Jesus did.6 Such an utterance would manifest the reason for his fear 
which he does not discover; indeed, he could not have been completely unaware of it. Of course, 
one might then go on to ask him why he was afraid of that and his answer may have assigned a 
cause to his fear in that particular situation: „Because of what happened in the garden of 
Gethsemane‟. This, more than his reason for being afraid, was what made him afraid; that is, it 
was the cause, which he might have to discover, of his fear.7 This categorial distinction is central 
precisely because human action – and akrasia – belongs conceptually with reasons and motives 
not with causes.  
Now, the case Anscombe has highlighted is an especially hard one. For St Peter did what he 
intended not to intentionally. In addition, as Anscombe noted, Peter‟s action was not a matter 
of his changing his mind about betraying Christ in such a way that he could justify doing so 
for a reason. To be sure, if that were the case, one would not speak of akrasia at all. Indeed, 
we need to seek an answer to the question: how does the akratês act differently without 
changing his mind? 
It is evident that, in Peter‟s case, remaining faithful to Jesus was not just a question of a 
banal promise or intention; it was part of his character, that is, part of his conception of what a 
human being‟s doing well in the circumstances would mean. Such a conception certainly 
enabled him to see what was practically relevant in his circumstances. He followed Jesus‟ 
tracks even when they led him to the High Priest‟s courtyard – not the safest place for Peter at 
the time. Of course, the danger in the situation was also registered by Peter, and this was 
liable to and, indeed, probably did, trigger a motivational susceptibility in him, which 
susceptibility was completely innocent with regards to his character as faithful disciple and 
friend; initially, at least, he gave it no practical importance. On entering the courtyard, what 
mattered about the situation was not that it was dangerous but, rather, that Jesus was under 
arrest and was being questioned there, and that he must not leave him alone. 
One must not forget that the conception of doing well in the circumstances is not an abstract 
framework of self-evident propositions or logical principles. If one is to talk of propositions at all, 
as belonging to and forming this background, one must speak of empirical „propositions‟ with a 
peculiar logical form. Here one will surely recall that, in his work On Certainty, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein noted that such „propositions‟ simply hold fast for the agent in his or her life. To be 
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sure, in different circumstances and with different experiences, individual ways of judging and 
acting can change their role in the language-game and become more fluid, just as more fluid 
„propositions‟ may become more solid. Also, while they do have a similar role, not all certainties 
have the same logical role. Their similar role lies in that one does not call them into question. The 
differences lie precisely in what it would take for one to doubt, or question, or be able to proceed 
intelligibly outside such judgments and ways of acting.8 And different circumstances could make 
one call into question different such certainties. For example, in Peter‟s case, what was in question 
was never his belonging and devotion to his own family, nor was it his recognition of God. 
Perhaps, a live doubt here would have dragged down everything with it and plunged it into chaos. 
Sadly, however, the dangerous circumstances did put Peter in a position where he was able to 
question what, hitherto, had been unquestioned in his life.9 
Indeed, the dangerous circumstances, and the connected fear constituted an extremely salient 
persuasive aspect which could have meant that Peter saw other practically relevant features in the 
situation; the violent animosity against anyone related to Jesus, for instance. Now, such a picture 
of practically relevant features of the situation would be entirely different from the one connected 
to his purpose not to betray Jesus; one could say that it partly constituted a different world. Just as 
Wittgenstein maintained in On Certainty, there is a logical gap between reasons and convictions; 
reasons, like justifications and explanations necessarily come to an end, and then one is convinced 
or acts one way or another. If one were to ask Peter the reason why he acted – whether he acted in 
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character or not – the answer he would give would hark to the desirability characterization he in 
fact acted upon. And if one were to press him as to why he chose one and not the other, he could 
well show that the question is empty and senseless. For the particular desirability characteristic he 
chose was what he would call a good reason in connection with his actual practice; that was just 
the way he judged, and just the way he acted. 
Peter‟s basic conviction was clearly his fidelity to Jesus. And this remained central to Peter‟s 
conception of excellence in the sense that it constituted the background within which value 
judgments in his life could be what they were and show what is deplorable and what not in his 
actions. It was this conception that was logically connected to opprobrium or satisfaction in his 
life. However, his situation was not a case where the alternative conviction – in this case, that of 
fear and the value of his safety – could not be understood. Neither was it a case where acting this 
way – that is, showing fear and thereby betraying Jesus – would destroy the whole business of 
judging and acting well. Peter‟s character was not annihilated, even when he knowingly did what 
he knew to be wrong. Indeed, he never did contradict his intention not to betray Jesus. One would 
say that Peter‟s wanting absolutely to remain faithful to Jesus and his wanting, at all costs, to 
protect his own safety do not conflict but, rather, they pass one another by: they shape and belong 
to two different practical pictures of the world. 
What we have here is a conflict of ultimate reasons or purposes for action that is not a merely 
empty or abstract one, but a real-life dilemma. The situation ends in (renewed) conviction, 
decision, or persuasion. However, it is not that Peter discussed with himself the pros and cons of 
one or the other. What underlay his life and his judgment at the time was a going on without any 
further reason. Of course, he could have refused to revise his practical judgment no matter how 
much the facts around him bucked. Again, however, he would not have done so for a further 
reason. What was there was an ultimate response to the quest for reasons, an intentional cleaving 
to a purpose, by Peter. The result was something like: this is what I will hold, what I really, really 
want in the circumstances! And what Peter really, really wanted in acting akratically, the ultimate 
„ground‟ he acted upon, was to look out for himself. 
Once again, one must stress that this conviction does not contradict that of not betraying Jesus. 
At no point does Peter change his mind and want, as his ultimate „ground‟, to betray Jesus! It is 
just that, when he did betray Jesus, that intention which was part of his conception of doing well 
ceased to be a reason for or against any action: his „ground‟ for acting was other. Indeed, Peter‟s 
ultimate purpose, from that of wanting to remain faithful to Jesus, became that of saving his skin. 
It is a situation where Peter suddenly sees a new aspect of the situation; he sees that a new kind of 
description can be given of the situation which remains the same yet now looks different so that 
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what is practically pertinent to him is different. It is as if he has brought a new aspect to what he 
sees, and he now sees the aspect along with the situation. It is itself hardly visible, and yet it 
spreads an ordering veil over the entire situation.10 Sadly, Peter could also say what he was doing 
in looking out for his own safety by denying that he knew Jesus, and once he decided for his new 
purpose in the circumstances, and acted accordingly, he did betray Jesus intentionally. 
For it was his decision to pursue the other ultimate purpose of saving his skin. What he did, in 
answering the servants, was, of course, intentional; what he was also doing was betraying Jesus 
but this had ceased to count as a „rule‟ or a value judgment marked by certainty – its role became 
that of a description of an aspect which was no longer practically relevant but only factually 
recognized. His purpose to remain faithful was not contradicted but, rather, it ceased to be used, 
by Peter, as a „rule‟. 
Of course, when Peter went for another conception or „ground‟ or ultimate reason for doing 
well in the circumstances because he wanted to, he knew he was not acting as he should. The 
opprobrium, at his decision or his allowing himself to be persuaded by an ultimate purpose that 
lay outside of the possibilities his conception of a good life showed him, was there. Such 
opprobrium could have been manifested in a number of ways: the deliberate shamelessness 
needed to say „So what!‟, or the attempt to excuse oneself: „There is nothing else I can do‟. The 
opprobrium overcome, the agent – Peter in this case – now has a different practical picture and 
what he sees as salient now is connected logically to his new „ground‟ or purpose. 
It is instructive to note at this point that, before betraying Jesus, Peter could well have made the 
assertion: „I will never betray you … unless I do‟ without contradiction! After all, Jesus did know 
that what Peter was averring was not going to be fulfilled and it would be absurd to think that 
what Jesus was saying was going to happen was not the very same thing as what Peter was saying 
was not going to happen. To elucidate further how this is so, it is useful to note that Peter could 
grammatically not have added, immediately and spontaneously „… but I intend to do so‟, or „… 
but I want to betray you‟, after avowing that he wanted not to be disloyal. For one cannot at the 
same time and in the same respect be conforming to a „rule‟ and to its contradictory. 
Nevertheless, one must admit that had Jesus not spoken, and had the situation not been so dire, 
the very thought that Peter might not, after all, remain faithful to Jesus would have seemed almost 
absurd to him. Here one must note two things. The first is that, while sometimes it does happen 
that people act out of character or contrary to their firm intention, mostly it does not; and when it 
does happen, it happens mostly in adverse or strange circumstances. The second point is that such 
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an action, contrary to one‟s character or firm intention, would not be a mistake. It would, rather, 
be something else: it would be seen as folly or absurdity. Peter, in expressing his intention, 
manifested a logical connection with acts that show fidelity; acts that constituted betrayal must 
have been viewed by him, not as mistaken but as excluded; not as false – and, therefore, possibly 
true – but as forbidden.11 
Therefore, while it is always logically possible to utter a statement like „I will never betray you 
… unless I do‟, in Peter‟s case, such an utterance is even more plausible given the context of 
Jesus‟ prophecy where, as a third person, he made it possible for Peter to think that. In more 
general terms, in the wider context that encompasses one‟s utterances – which, after all, includes 
other persons –, one can look on oneself and one’s utterances, as if one were a third person; after 
all the „I‟ who utters is also a third person in the world. 
Now, when Peter was actually committing the akratic deed, he could say for what reason he 
was doing that. In addition, he could say that he was being akratic, not within the background of 
his present ‘purpose-ground’ but, rather, within the background of his remembered intention 
which showed his character. In this sense, Peter would then be taking up the same relation to his 
description of his own character as if it „belonged‟ to a third party. One must here note that it is 
not as if he were a completely different person: he would recognize some continuity in his life, 
even if, at the time, he rejected as irrelevant what he could have seen went unquestioned before, 
since some yardsticks of judging and acting remained fixed in his life. Indeed, he has not, and 
cannot have jettisoned all such values, norms, and certainties for others. One must also note that, 
while he can see that his action is aberrant and foolish in the light of his previous conception, he is 
not remorseful at the time he commits what he sees to be akratic since that action is intelligible in 
the context of the practical picture of the world he has intentionally cleaved to. Later, in his 
remorseful state, Peter could understand why he was so shockingly disloyal; he could understand 
his action as intelligible both within the background of his erstwhile world-picture, and within that 
of a particular pattern of human behaviour, that is sadly there, but which he does not want to make 
his own in his life. Of course, he does not understand his action as justifiable at all although it is 
now there whereas before, the possibility of that happening was not an issue.12 
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When more normal circumstances prevailed again (which happened when Jesus looked at 
Peter), Peter looks in horror at what he has done. One must note, here, that, in the agent‟s 
reverting to his or her original character, there is an element of a fresh decision, aided by the 
release in the „pressure‟ of the persuading situation. There is a decision to show remorse at one‟s 
actions. Of course the more truly the judgment one decided to overturn was part of the scaffolding 
of one‟s life, the more „easy‟ is the decision to „take up‟ again that which was not, in practice, 
doubted before. The terribleness of the deed committed is, however, another fact that is there as 
part of one‟s life and that may serve to convince the agent that, after all, in his previous practical 
world-picture he was not competent to judge. Indeed, some people are changed by an event in 
which they committed some deed which would have been unthinkable to them before. What is so 
tragic, in Peter‟s case, is that he passed from being someone for whom certain doubts were 
logically excluded because they informed his horizon of action, to being able to doubt and indeed 
deny his fidelity to Jesus. In acting incompatibly with what he could say is acting well, he did 
what, beforehand, he would have seen as being folly, and he did so intentionally. With horror, he 
can see that, in that respect, it was as if he were a different person. 
                                                                                                                                                        
within the „nest of propositions‟ that formed his character. None of these ways of acting has a fixed position on 
its own account but only has such a role together with others in the world-picture that constitutes the agent‟s 
character. Some of them can change role within the element of the whole world-picture of the agent. However, it 
is inconceivable that all such „logical‟ propositions change together: this is a logical requisite of continuing to 
speak of a person at all. Similarly, it is also unimaginable that certain ways of acting are overturned abruptly in 
the life of a person; that would seem to knock from under the person‟s feet the „ground‟ on which he or she can 
make any judgments at all. He or she would descend into chaos; all yardsticks of judging and acting would be 
swept away in his or her life. That would not be akrasia, but some kind of madness. 
